Gradual Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda: A Path-Dependent Model

This article proposes a method for considering the bargaining agenda as an endogenous phenomenon in gradual bargaining games, understood as being path-dependent processes. Some short, medium and long-term results for bargaining are presented, as well as a possible application for the model.

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Year of publication:	2005-02-07
Authors:	Arevalo, Julian J.
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Game theory \| Bargaining \| Path-Dependent Processes

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22. Game theory, Bargaining, Path-Dependent Processes 22 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550892