Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity : models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sarkar, Sumit |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 277.2019, 2 (1.9.), p. 633-642
|
Subject: | Behavioural OR | Psychological game theory | Non-contractible quality | Principal-agent problem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Qualitätsmanagement | Quality management |
-
Optimal dynamic auditing based on game theory
Anastasopoulos, Nikolaos, (2021)
-
The performance measurement trap
Kuksov, Dmitri, (2019)
-
Classical and belief-based gift exchange models : theory and evidence
Dhami, Sanjit S., (2021)
- More ...
-
Adversarial Classification : Impact of Agents’ Faking Cost on Firms and Agents
Cezar, Asunur, (2020)
-
Sarkar, Sumit, (2019)
-
Incorporating a “no claim bonus” in insurance agency contract
Sarkar, Sumit, (2018)
- More ...