GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?

Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
Published in:	Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. - Western Agricultural Economics Association - WAEA. - Vol. 27.2002, 02
Publisher:	Western Agricultural Economics Association - WAEA
Subject:	Environmental Economics and Policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005805343