Groundwater usage and strategic complements, Part I, Instrumental variables

Caleb M. Koch and Heinrich H. Nax

We test whether the decisions in a common-pool resource game are better modeled game- theoretically as strategic substitutes or complements using an individual-level dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. Based on a regression framework with instrumental variables, we find support for strategic complements, suggesting that reciprocity- and/or race-to-depletion-like dynamics are key to understanding groundwater usage.

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Koch, Caleb M. ; Nax, Heinrich H.
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 13.2022, 5, Art.-No. 67, p. 1-19
Subject:	common-pool resources \| US agriculture \| groundwater \| dynamic game theory \| panel data \| identification \| Grundwasser \| Groundwater \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Panel \| Panel study \| Gemeingüter \| Commons \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| IV-Schätzung \| Instrumental variables \| Landwirtschaft \| Agriculture

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g13050067 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets ; Q20 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management. General ; Q25 - Water
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418068