Group Contracting and Enforcement

We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Laffont, Jean-Jaques ; N'Guessan, Tchétché
Published in:	Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 157.2001, 4, p. 487-487

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823377