Group Size and Cooperation
To compare the effects of group size on cooperation, we introduce a class of simple multiperson games. These games can be regarded as n-person generalizations of the two-person prisoner's dilemma with expected value payoffs. In order to ensure that identical expected-value monetary alternatives are available to players in different-sized groups, we introduced a certain formal constraint on payoffs. Results of an experimental study comparing three-and seven-person groups show that the smaller-sized group is markedly more cooperative than the larger group. The primary emphasis of this paper is methodological. It demonstrates a technique to measure cooperation as a function of group size unconfounded by role-playing and utility considerations.
| Year of publication: |
1975
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hamburger, Henry ; Guyer, Melvin ; Fox, John |
| Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 19.1975, 3, p. 503-531
|
| Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
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