Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains : characterization results
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Barberà, Salvador ; Berga Colom, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 41.2012, 4, p. 791-808
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Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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