Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Neyman, Abraham ; Okada, Daijiro
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Soziale Beziehungen \| Beschränkte Rationalität \| Zeit \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Entropie \| Theorie \| Bounded Rationality \| Strategy Set Growth \| Strategic Complexity \| Nonstationary Bounded Recall \| Repeated Games \| Entropy

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2005-14
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	508623774 [GVK] hdl:10419/31298 [Handle] RePEc:rut:rutres:200514 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360