Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Year of publication: |
2014-08
|
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Powell, Michael ; Wilkening, Tom |
Institutions: | Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät |
Subject: | Implementation theory | incomplete contracts | experiments |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | ECON - Working Papers. - ISSN 1664-7041. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Econ working papers Number 171 |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior |
Source: |
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst, (2014)
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Fehr, Ernst, (2015)
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