Has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation?
by George-Levi Gayle and Robert A. Miller
| Year of publication: |
2009
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gayle, George-Levi ; Miller, Robert Allen |
| Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 99.2009, 5, p. 1740-1769
|
| Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Betriebsgröße | Firm size | USA | United States |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L25 - Firm Size and Performance ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936335