Herding with collective preferences

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Ali, S. ; Kartik, Navin
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 51.2012, 3, p. 601-626
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Social learning \| Observational learning \| Herd behavior \| Payoff interdependence \| Sequential voting \| Momentum

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010600661