Heteroscedasticity of residual spending after risk equalization : a potential source of selection incentives in health insurance markets with premium regulation
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Oskam, Michel ; Kleef, Richard Cornelis van ; Douven, Rudy |
Published in: |
The European journal of health economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1618-7601, ZDB-ID 2011428-X. - Vol. 25.2024, 3, p. 379-396
|
Subject: | Health insurance | Risk adjustment | Risk equalization | Risk selection | Krankenversicherung | Risikomodell | Risk model | Risiko | Risk | Theorie | Theory | Regulierung | Regulation | Versicherungsbeitrag | Insurance premium | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Gesundheitsfinanzierung | Health care financing |
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