Heteroscedasticity of residual spending after risk equalization : a potential source of selection incentives in health insurance markets with premium regulation
| Year of publication: | 
                              2024         | 
|---|---|
| Authors: | Oskam, Michel ; Kleef, Richard Cornelis van ; Douven, Rudy | 
| Published in: | 
                  	  	      	    The European journal of health economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1618-7601, ZDB-ID 2011428-X. - Vol. 25.2024, 3, p. 379-396      	   | 
| Subject: | Health insurance | Risk adjustment | Risk equalization | Risk selection | Krankenversicherung | Risikomodell | Risk model | Risiko | Risk | Theorie | Theory | Regulierung | Regulation | Versicherungsbeitrag | Insurance premium | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Gesundheitsfinanzierung | Health care financing | 
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                      Risk adjustment with an outside option Newhouse, Joseph P., (2017) 
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