Hierarchical decentralization of incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Melumad, Nahum D. |
Other Persons: | Mookherjee, Dilip (contributor) ; Reichelstein, Stefan (contributor) |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 26.1995, 4, p. 654-672
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Subject: | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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