Horizontal concentration and vertical relationships / Concentration horizontale et relations verticales

This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In a two-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show that downstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitable than upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the incentives to merge at the other level. Endogenizing the firms' decisions to merge by considering a merger game supports the previous results.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	ALLAIN, Marie-Laure ; SOUAM, Saïd
Published in:	Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2006, 82, p. 103-127
Publisher:	École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE)

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066071