How do labor representatives affect incentive orientation of executive compensation? : editor's choice
Katharina Dyballa and Kornelius Kraft
| Year of publication: |
2020
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| Authors: | Dyballa, Katharina ; Kraft, Kornelius |
| Published in: |
CESifo economic studies : a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1612-7501, ZDB-ID 2108821-4. - Vol. 66.2020, 1, p. 60-90
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| Subject: | executive compensation | board representation | principal-agent theory | corporatefinance | Hausman-Taylor | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Lohn | Wages | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1093/cesifo/ifz010 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181677