How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?
Year of publication: |
January 2017
|
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Authors: | Shue, Kelly |
Other Persons: | Townsend, Richard (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Schätzung | Estimation | USA | United States | 1992-2010 |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w23091 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w23091 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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