How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Ingolf Dittmann, Ko-Chia Yu, and Dan Zhang
| Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dittmann, Ingolf ; Yu, Ko-Chia ; Zhang, Dan |
| Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 1572-3097, ZDB-ID 2145284-2. - Vol. 21.2017, 5, p. 1805-1846
|
| Subject: | Stock options | Effort aversion | Executive compensation | Risk aversion | Risk-taking incentives | Optimal strike price | Managervergütung | Risikoaversion | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Lohn | Wages | Arbeitskampf | Industrial action |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1093/rof/rfx019 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011804460