How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sheng, Jiliang ; Yang, Yanyan ; Xiaoting Wang ; Yang, Jun |
Subject: | Information acquisition incentive | Nonlinear benchmark | Performance-based contract | Price informativeness | Benchmarking | Börsenkurs | Share price | Preis | Price | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtlineare Regression | Nonlinear regression | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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