How often do managers withhold information?
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Bertomeu, Jeremy ; Ma, Paul ; Marinovic, Iván |
Published in: |
The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association. - Lakewood Ranch, FL : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0001-4826, ZDB-ID 210224-9. - Vol. 95.2020, 4, p. 73-102
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Subject: | voluntary disclosure | management forecasts | information endowment | strategic witholding | structural estimation | disclosure cost | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Informationswert | Information value | Führungskräfte | Managers |
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