How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Ichino, Andrea ; Muehlheusser, Gerd |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |
Subject: | Leistungskontrolle | Agency Theory | Kosten | Leistungsmotivation | Theorie | monitoring | probation | effort | asymmetric information |
Series: | IZA Discussion Papers ; 987 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 378140426 [GVK] hdl:10419/20222 [Handle] |
Classification: | M5 - Personnel Economics ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; D2 - Production and Organizations |
Source: |
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How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea, (2004)
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How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents
Muehlheusser, Gerd, (2004)
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How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents
Ichino, Andrea, (2003)
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How often should you open the door? : optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents
Ichino, Andrea, (2008)
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How often should you open the door? : Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents
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How often should you open the door? : Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents
Ichino, Andrea, (2004)
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