How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
| Year of publication: |
2023
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Wynant, Luc ; Manigart, Sophie ; Collewaert, Veroniek |
| Published in: |
Venture capital : an international journal of entrepreneurial finance. - London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1464-5343, ZDB-ID 2032399-2. - Vol. 25.2023, 2, p. 135-160
|
| Subject: | adverse selection | agency theory | Buy-out | contracts | incomplete contract theory | moral hazard | private equity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Private Equity | Private equity | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Übernahme | Takeover | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Vertrag | Contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
-
Chen, Fangruo, (2016)
-
Control and contract design in research collaborations : a complete contract perspective
Panico, Claudio, (2012)
-
Optimal tenurial contracts under both moral hazard and adverse selection
At, Christian, (2019)
- More ...
-
Relocation to Get Venture Capital : A Resource Dependence Perspective
De Prijcker, Sofie, (2017)
-
Human capital and the internationalisation of venture capital firms
Manigart, Sophie, (2007)
-
First-round valuation of angel-backed companies : the role of investor human capital
Collewaert, Veroniek, (2009)
- More ...