How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Anbarcı, Nejat ; Feltovich, Nick |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 16.2013, 4, p. 560-596
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Subject: | Nash demand game | Unstructured bargaining | Disagreement | Experiment | Risk aversion | Social preference | Other-regarding behaviour | Bargaining power | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Risikoaversion | Verhandlungsmacht | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Entscheidung unter Risiko | Decision under risk |
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