How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish
| Year of publication: |
2014-02
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hörtnagl, Tanja ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf |
| Institutions: | Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik |
| Subject: | Value of Information | Value of Commitment | Sequential Move Game | Imperfect Observability | Stackelberg Duopoly | First-Mover Advantage |
| Extent: | application/pdf |
|---|---|
| Series: | |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Notes: | 2 pages long |
| Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
| Source: |
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Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2014)
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Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2014)
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Strategic Information Acquisition.
Sasaki, Dan, (1997)
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Heterogeneity in Rent-Seeking Contests with Multiple Stages: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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Heterogeneity in rent-seeking contests with multiple stages: Theory and experimental evidence
Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2013)
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Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2014)
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