How to Control Controlled School Choice : Comment

Echenique and Yenmez [AER 2015, 105(8): 2679-94] study choice rules for a school that express preferences for a diverse student body. Their Theorem 2 characterizes choice rules that are "generated by reserves for the priority". We show that the "only if part" is not correct. We exhibit a choice rule that is generated by reserves for the priority but violates one of their axioms. A similar issue arises in Theorem D.2., where a priority is allowed to be endogenous. We reformulate the axioms and repair the results

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Doğan, Battal
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Schulauswahl \| School choice \| Matching \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Diversity Management \| Diversity management

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 4, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2796770 [DOI]
Classification:	d47 ; H75 - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare ; I21 - Analysis of Education ; I28 - Government Policy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126788