How to license a public licensor's technology to an asymmetric duopoly

We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the public licensor licenses his patented technology to only an efficient (low-cost) firm maximizing its profit.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Ebina, Takeshi ; Kishimoto, Shin
Published in:	Economics and Business Letters. - Departamento de Economía. - Vol. 1.2012, 2, p. 16-26
Publisher:	Departamento de Economía

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011208104