How to pay envious managers : a theoretical analysis
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Crummenerl, Marc ; Doll, Tilmann ; Koziol, Christian |
Published in: |
European financial management : the journal of the European Financial Management Association. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1354-7798, ZDB-ID 1235378-4. - Vol. 21.2015, 4, p. 811-832
|
Subject: | executive compensation | inequity aversion | cournot competition | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure |
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