I know something you don't know! : the role of linking pin directors in monitoring and incentive alignment
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
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Authors: | Brandes, Pamela ; Dharwadkar, Ravi ; Suh, SangHyun |
Published in: |
Strategic management journal. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 0143-2095, ZDB-ID 164405-1. - Vol. 37.2016, 5, p. 964-981
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Subject: | boards | executive compensation | monitoring | board committees | agency conflicts | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vorstand | Executive board | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory |
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