I want YOU! An experiment studying the selction effect when assigning distributive power

In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then take part in a 3-person game. In the game one player chooses between two possibilities. The first is an outside option which assigns a positive amount to that player, but leaves the two others empty-handed. The second option consists in the assignment of power over the distribution of pie among three players to one of the other two players. Our main treatments differ with respect to the selection procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowlingly selected partner. When making her decisions the choosing player could consult the answers to the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Our results show, that, as a first reaction, knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones. We also find that, in both treatments, they allocate more to the players that have given them distributive power than to thrid players. In our data competition has motivational and not only allocative consequences.