Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; van Winden, Frans
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Wahlkampf \| Wahlverhalten \| Interessenvertretung \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Theorie \| Spatial voting models \| electoral competition \| winning set \| interest groups

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 09-095/1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	839157452 [GVK] hdl:10419/86766 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090095 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325751