Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Erkut, Hande ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Sefton, Martin
Publisher:	Nottingham : The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Subject:	social norms \| dictator games

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Series:	CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; 2014-16
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	80712141X [GVK] hdl:10419/129829 [Handle]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444307