If only I could sack you! Management turnover and performance in Great German Banks between 1874 and 1913
We analyse the relation of firm performance and managerial turnover in 19th century German banking by probit estimation. This period covers a major reform of corporate governance. Before the reform performance and turnover were unrelated, whereas after the reform more successful managers left firms more seldom. However, only short-run performance matters in this turnover-success relationship.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Bayer, Christian ; Burhop, Carsten |
Published in: |
Applied Economics Letters. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1350-4851. - Vol. 16.2009, 2, p. 141-145
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
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