Imitation and Crowd : A Different Approach to the Bertrand Paradox

This paper provides the Nash equilibrium under homogeneous duopoly a la Bertrand. The optimal consumers' behaviour is obtained assuming a specific externality in the utility function. This externality permits to consider at the same time, and not alternatively, the imitation and the crowd effect, which are opposite force at work. The result gives prices over marginal cost and the strong sensibility of preferences to the crowd effect

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Di Cintio, Marco
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Imitationsstrategie \| Imitation strategy \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 24, 2003 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.448300 [DOI]
Classification:	D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D62 - Externalities ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029784