We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the models to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data also provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Published in The text is part of a series Documentos de trabajo - Lan Gaiak, Departamento de Economía, UPNA Number 0306 43 pages
Classification:
C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets