Impact of a financial risk-sharing scheme on budget-impact estimations: a game-theoretic approach

In reaction to applying a substantial risk-sharing rebate α on the manufacturer, both players are expected to adjust their budget estimates toward an optimal equilibrium. Increasing α is a better vehicle for reaching the desired equilibrium rather than increasing γ, as the manufacturer’s rebate α substantially influences both players, whereas γ has little effect on the players behavior. </AbstractSection> Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Gavious, Arieh ; Greenberg, Dan ; Hammerman, Ariel ; Segev, Ella
Published in:	The European Journal of Health Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 15.2014, 5, p. 553-561
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Risk sharing \| Health plans \| Pharmaceutical industry \| Budget impact

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993959