Impact of Manager Compensation on Portfolio Risk and Return

This paper takes an investor's view on the problem of delegating asset management authority to a manager. We study the implications of a typical hedge fund contract when the manager is allowed to adjust the activeness of the portfolio dynamically over time in a setting similar to Carpenter (2000). We find that taking managerial compensation into the analysis can have considerable consequences for the probability distribution of assets

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Year of publication:	[2015]
Authors:	Gupta, Pranay
Other Persons:	Skallsjö, Sven R. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 11, 2007 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1021175 [DOI]
Classification:	G11 - Portfolio Choice ; G12 - Asset Pricing ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707783