Impact of ownership types and political connection on private equity placement : Empirical evidence from China

Purpose In China, private equity placement (PEP) has become the most important equity refinancing method because most listed firms issue new stocks in this method. However, previous literature has not paid much attention to the impact of political connections on PEP. In this paper, the authors aim to focus on the effect of ultimate ownership types and political connections on approval, approval time, approval results and proceeds of PEP. Besides that the authors also explore the influence of different types and levels of political connections on PEP. Design/methodology/approach This study investigates the impact of ultimate ownership and political connections of private firms on the approval of PEPs. The authors obtain a final sample of 1,651 private placement events of Chinese-listed firms. To test the hypothesis that the authors developed in this paper, the authors use empirical models from the existing literature about political connections and corporate finance. They establish multiple linear regressions to test Hypothesis 1 and 3 and introduce a logit model to test Hypothesis 2. Findings First, this study documents that state-owned firms have significant advantages over private firms in approval procedure. Second, political connections seem to help private firms obtain approval of placements from China Securities Regulatory Commission. Third, political connections through government officers are not useful for firms to obtain refinance resources, whereas the connections of being members of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and People’s Congress are the two valuable types of political connections to help private firms obtain approval. Originality/value This paper has three main contributions to the previous literature. The first contribution is to provide an evidence for the relation between political connections and PEP approval procedures. The second contribution is to provide a comparison between government officer’s connection and social title’s connection. The third contribution of this paper is to reveal the influence of non-disclosed political connection on PEP approval. All the three contributions are important for understanding the relation between political connections and firm refinancial policy.