Impacts of government interventions on pricing policies of the dual-channel supply chain by considering retailer services

In this study, the implications of the government's tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government's tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled in six scenarios in a competitive mode about service level, social welfare, and government's revenue-seeking policies. It can be concluded that retailer services affect the optimal manufacturer and retailer's decisions. Moreover, with the sensitivities analysis that was studied on government models, it was shown that an integrated SC could better serve the government to achieve its goals. Also, the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailer of a dual-channel supply chain have been reached to the government's social and economic goals. It can be found that the government with proper tariffs could coordinate social, economic, and service objectives.