Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility

Bester and Strausz [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2001. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the single agent case. Econometrica 69, 1077-1098] showed that the revelation principle is invalid in a multi-agent, no-commitment setting. We show that if transfers are possible it does apply in their setting unless at least two agents have private information.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Evans, Robert ; Reiche, Sönje
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 3, p. 611-614
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005296837