Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games

In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Ritzberger, Klaus
Publisher:	Vienna : Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Subject:	commitments \| imperfect observability \| subgame perfection

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Series:	Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; 35
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	735469598 [GVK] hdl:10419/68642 [Handle] RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:35 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291055