Implementability, Walrasian equilibria and efficient matchings

Piotr Dworczak and Anthony Lee Zhang

In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient matching between types and goods

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Year of publication:	July 7, 2016
Authors:	Dworczak, Piotr ; Zhang, Anthony Lee
Publisher:	[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business]
Subject:	Implementability \| Walrasian Equilibrium \| Multidimensional Screening \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| General equilibrium \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (ca. 10 Seiten)
Series:	Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper. - Rochester, NY : Social Science Electronic Publishing, ZDB-ID 2865911-9. - Vol. no. 15-30]
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2605306 [DOI]
Classification:	D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011862156