Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environments using as a solution concept one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies and one round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Cabrales, A. ; Ponti, G.
Subject:	LEARNING \| ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM \| GAMES

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776902