Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Vida, Péter
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 8.2013, 1, p. 95-123
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Bayesian game \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| pre-play communication

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE944 [DOI] 894222813 [GVK] hdl:10419/150186 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:944 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011599477