Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria

We consider agents who do not have any information about others' preferences. In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to obtain their most preferred alternative. This defines a solution concept for games symmetrical to Barbera and Dutta's protective equilibrium, the demanding equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for self implementation in demanding equilibria (side) of social choice functions are provided.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Merlin, Vincent
Institutions:	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Subject:	Implementation \| Social Choice Function \| Demanding Equilibrium \| Voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series RePEc:hoh:hohdip Number 191/2000 24 pages
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090422