Implementation via approval mechanisms
Year of publication: |
July 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Núñez, Matías ; Xefteris, Dimitrios |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 170.2017, p. 169-181
|
Subject: | Nash implementation | Strategy-proofness | Approval voting | Single-peakedness | Condorcet winner | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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