Implementing efficient market structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und Simulation ökonomischer Prozesse, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	auctions \| mechanism design \| natural oligopoly \| entry

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2000,19
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424