Implementing Efficient Market Structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	Mechanism design \| natural oligopoly \| auctions \| entry

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 269
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405905