Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Serrano, Roberto ; Vohra, Rajiv
Publisher:	Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Theorie \| Mas-Colell bargaining set \| implementation \| approximate implementation \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2001-24
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	330700545 [GVK] hdl:10419/80217 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986