Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Serrano, Roberto ; Vohra, Rajiv
Published in:	Investigaciones Economicas. - Fundación SEPI. - Vol. 26.2002, 2, p. 285-298
Publisher:	Fundación SEPI
Subject:	Mas-Colell bargaining set \| implementation \| approximate implementation \| subgame perfect equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Notes:	Published
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690062