Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

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Year of publication:	2005-06
Authors:	Aguirre, Arin ; Javier, Francisco ; Feltkamp, Vincent
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IKERLANAK.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Ikerlanak 2005.17 Number 2005-17
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187618