Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary. JEL Classification: E61, H87

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Year of publication:	2003-09
Authors:	Catenaro, Marco ; Vidal, Jean-Pierre
Institutions:	European Central Bank
Subject:	International Fiscal Issues \| Policy Co-ordination

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 0259
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005530718